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ON THE IRRELEVANCE OF COLLUSION IN PERFECTLY
CORRELATED ENVIRONMENTS
Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

ABSTRACT

I study a class of agency problems that are characterized by the existence of an underlying
organizational hierarchy. Specifically, I analyze a two-forked, three-tiered hierarchy, and I show that
when the private information of the players in the second and in the third tiers of the hierarchy across
the two forks of the hierarchy is perfectly correlated, collusion by the players notwithstanding, the
principal can always implement the full information optimum in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
JEL Classification: C72, D82

Key words: collusion, contract, hierarchy

/

ON THE IRRELEVANCE OF COLLUSION IN PERFECTLY
CORRELATED ENVIRONMENTS!

1. Introduction

The setting of many agency problems in economics involves the analysis of an organizational
hierarchy. Consider the problem of designing an international environmental agreement (lEA); this
problem has been studied by Barrett (1994), Batabyal (1996, 1997, 1998a), and Bernauer (1995).
This mechanism design question cannot be analyzed meaningfully without studying the hierarchical
interactions of three players. These three players include a relevant international institution (the
principal), national governments (the intermediaries) and polluting firms (the agents) in the various
countries?

As a second example, consider the problem of designing effective rural wage

compensation schemes, a problem that has been studied by Bardhan (1984), Basu (1992), and
Eswaran and Kotwal (1985), among others. Here the relevant design problem once again involves
the analysis of a hierarchy; this hierarchy consists of an absentee landlord (the principal), village
level supervisors (the intermediaries), and village tenants (the agents).3

II acknowledge fmancial support from the Faculty Research Grant program at Utah State University and the
Utah Agricultural Experiment Station, Utah State University, Logan, UT 84322-4810, by way of grant UTA 024.
Approved as journal paper No. 6085. I thank Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jacques Lawarree for providing me with access
to their unpublished work. I alone am responsible for the contents of this paper.

2Note that it is not possible to dispense with the government function. In designing an lEA, international
institutions interact with national governments directly and with polluting fIrms only indirectly. As such, any
meaningful analysis of the lEA design question must analyze the role of national governments.
31 have in mind situations in which it is not possible-or possible only at great cost-to do away with the
supervisory function.
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In addition to the existence of an explicit organizational hierarchy, these kinds of problems

are characterized by two other attributes which deserve some comment. 4 First, the players occupying .
the second and the third tiers of the hierarchy typically possess private information about some
aspect of the underlying problem. In the first example above, governments and firms in the
individual countries can be expected to possess private information about the available pollution
abatement technology. In the second example, the village tenants will have private information
about their productivity. As a result, if the underlying hierarchy contains more than one fork, i.e.,
more than one vertical structure, then the question of possible correlation in the private information
of the players across the forks is relevant. Second, whenever the principal grants some authority to
another player in the hierarchy, that player may choose to exercise the authority for a purpose other
than the one intended by the principal. In other words, potential collusion by the players occupying
the second and the third tiers of the hierarchy becomes an issue. With regard to my earlier examples,
governments and firms within a country may collude to thwart the objectives of an international
institution,5 or tenants and supervisors within a village may collude to the detriment of the absentee
landlord.
Given this background, I propose to extend the hierarchies literature by formally analyzing
a two-forked, three-tiered hierarchy with five players. Specifically, I shall show that when the
private information of the players in the second and in the third tiers of the hierarchy across the two

4p or other examples involving the analysis of hierarchies, see Tirole (1994), and Laffont and Martirnort (1996).
5See Peterson (1993) for a discussion of some practical instances of possible governmentlfmn collusion in an
international setting.
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forks of the hierarchy is perfectly correlated, collusion notwithstanding, the principal can always
implement the full information optimum in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
In other words, in perfectly correlated environments, the principal can engage in relative
performance evaluation to effectively extract all the surplus from the players in the second and the
third tiers of the two-forked hierarchy. To comprehend the assumption of perfect correlation, recall
the two examples discussed above. With regard to the first example, I have in mind polluting firms
in countries with very similar pollution abatement technologies (Norway and Sweden). In this
situation, the random variables denoting the private information regarding the quality of the two
pollution abatement technologies can be thought of as being perfectly correlated. With regard to the
second example, I have in mind villages located close to each other. In this setting, the impact of
land quality, rainfall, etc., is likely to affect the productivities of crop-growing tenants in any two
/

villages very similarly. Thus, the private information about tenant productivity in the two villages
can be expected to be very strongly correlated. Suppose that the main function of the player
occupying the second tier of the hierarchy is that of monitoring and then reporting the results of such
monitoring to the principal. 6 Then the private information of these two players can be expected to
be strongly correlated as well. Going back to my two examples, intermediaries in similar countries
and in similar villages can be expected to have access to monitoring equipment that is of comparable
quality. As a result, the random variables denoting the stochastic outcome of monitoring in the two
countries or villages will be strongly correlated.

6Several papers have adopted this approach. For instance, see Kofman and Lawarree (1993 , 1995). The reader
should note that monitoring/reporting need not be the main function. Later in this section, I shall provide examples in
which other tasks are more important.

4
In an environment of perfect correlation, multiple equilibria-a major issue in many agency
models-pose no problems and hence attention can be restricted to contracts that can be
implemented by the principal in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. As such, issues of augmentation
(MookheIjee and Reichelstein 1990) or the design of equivalent dominant strategy mechanisms
(MookheIjee and Reichelstein 1992) are not relevant.
Sappington and Demski (1983) have studied ex pose contracting in a two-tiered hierarchy
with two states of nature and perfectly correlated private information. They show that the full
information optimum can be implemented by the principal in a dominant strategy equilibrium.
Three-tiered hierarchies with a single fork have been studied by Tirole (1986), Demski and
Sappington (1987), and Kofman and Lawarree (1993). These researchers have studied the properties
of the ex post equilibrium contract governing the interaction between a single principal, a single
intermediary (often a boss or a manager), and a single agent. Demski and Sappington (1987) and
Kofman and Lawarree (1993) assume that monitoring is possible whereas Tirole (1986) assumes that
monitoring is impossible.
In this paper, I have three objectives.

First, I shall investigate the robustness of the

Sappington and Demski (1983) result by analyzing a model with an expanded state space and an
increased number of tiers. As indicated in the introductory paragraph to this paper, the principal
purpose of this paper is to analyze agency problems that are characterized by the existence of an
organizational hierarchy. In these problems, the hierarchical nature of the interaction between the
various players is what is of interest. As such, it is not possible to dispense with the middle tier and

7By ex post I mean a situation in which some players acquire their private information before contracting.
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meaningfully analyze such problems. Two examples of these kinds of problems were provided
earlier. Many other examples of such three-tiered hierarchies come to mind. In the context of a
manufacturing firm, a commonly existing hierarchy is that of the manager/foreman/worker. In the
context of defense procurement, the typical hierarchy is that of the Defense Department/
contractor(s)/subcontractor(s). Finally as a third example, consider the shareholder/manager/worker
hierarchy. In all of these examples, the second tier is an essential component of the hierarchy. The
manager cannot ignore the foreman, the Defense Department typically does not deal with
subcontractors directly, and shareholders do not interact with workers directly.
Due to the relevance of the second tier, and because the players in the second and the third
tiers of the hierarchy possess private information, the possibility of collusion by some of these
players emerges. National governments and polluting firms within a country may collude against
an international institution, the foreman and the worker may collude to the detriment of a manager,
and in the context of defense procurement, contractors and subcontractors may collude.
Consequently, a significant part of my analysis will consist of analyzing the properties of collusionproof contracts.
Second, I shall study the vertical and horizontal interaction effects that arise from the perfect
correlation in the private information of the second- and the third-tier players in this more general
model. Third, I shall discuss some conditions under which the first best implementation result of
Sappington and Demski (1983)

~nd

that of this paper does not hold. The reader will note that in a

sense, this paper extends the multiagent contract theory literature vertically and the hierarchies
literature laterally. Specifically, I shall study ex post contracting between a single principal, two
intermediaries and two agents. The principal's task is to design an incentive compatible, and
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collusion-proof contract, which will extract all the surplus from the intermediaries and the agents
in the two-forked, three-tiered hierarchy. I shall focus on the case in which the private information
of the intermediaries and the agents in the two forks of the hierarchy is perfectly correlated. In this
setting, I shall demonstrate the power of relative performance evaluation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I describe the model in detail and
then I characterize the first best or full information optimum. In section 3, I analyze the abovedescribed hierarchy with possible collusion by intermediaries and agents in the two forks of the
hierarchy. In section 4, I offer some concluding comments.

2. The Theoretical Framework

2a. Description of the Model

J

Superscripts A and B will denote the two forks and subscripts i

=

1, ... , 4 will refer to the

state of nature. In what follows, I shall focus on forkA. The reader should note that although I am
focussing on fork A, the analysis is identical for fork B. In particular, all the subsequent results for
fork A can be obtained for fork B by simply interchanging the two superscripts. Let

eA denote the

uncertainty about agent productivity; eA has binary support [eAL,e AH], where eAH>eAL>o, and

ileA=e AH- eAL . I shall refer to eAL as the low-productivity parameter and to eAH as the highproductivity parameter.
The risk-averse agent inA produces a good whose output and value in state i are denoted by x l.A ~ 0.
The agent chooses action e.l A >

°

in state i. The agent's disutility of action is gee l.A), with

gl(e) > 0, gll(e) > 0, and g(O) = 0. This agent has a utility function U[T.~
- g(e l.A)], with
II

°

< a U[ e ]/aT.~
< 00, \jT.~.
T.~
~
II
II
II

°

is the monetary transfer made by the principal to the A agent
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when he produces x I.A and the B agent produces
AA

AA

U

AA

U[ T ]; both U

X .B.
I

AA

and the reservation transfer T

The A agent's reservation utility

IS

are common knowledge.

By employing a monitoring device, the risk-averse intermediary in A receives a signal ~
from the agent regarding his private information and then he (the intermediary) provides a report-,A
to the principal indicating what he observes about the agent's productivity parameter. 8 In some
states of nature, this monitoring device malfunctions and, hence, in these states the intermediary will
be unable to provide the principal with a useful report. The intermediary has a strictly concave and
differentiable utility function V( GII.~), where GII.~ is the monetary transfer made to the A intermediary
when he reports rA
and the B intermediary reports r I.B. I assume that 0 < V i (GII.~) <
I
AA

TheA intermediary's reservation utility is V

AA

AA

00,

VGII.~.
AA

= V( G ); both V and the reservation transfer G

are common knowledge. 9

J

The principal is risk neutral and he has a profit function defined over goods that takes the

= ~/(x 1 - G 1 - T I), 1 = A, B.

form

1t

XA =

eA

+ eA.

Note that the output produced by the A agent is

As stated, the principal's profit is the difference between the total production of

good x and the sum of the intermediary and the agent transfers. The principal designs the main
contract, which he offers to the intermediary and the agent. This contract can only be conditioned
on what the principal actually observes, i.e., the two intermediary reports -,A and,.s, and the two
output levels .xA and xB.

8Since my main objective is not to study monitoring, I shall assume that the use of this monitoring device is
costless.
9The reader will note that the analysis involves both forks. To see this, note that, inter alia, the transfers to the
agent and the intermediary have two subscripts. The fIrst subscript corresponds to fork A and the second subscript
corresponds to fork B.
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There are four states of nature, each state occumng with probability p I. > 0, with
~\..I'
p I. = 1.
vi

The random variables

eA

eB

and

are perfectly correlated.

The principal, the

intermediary and the agent in A sign the contract holding asymmetric information about
contract is ex post, i.e., it is signed after the agent has observed
before choosing his action.
information.

eA.

eA.

The

The agent always observes

eA

The intermediary mayor may not observe the agent's private

This depends on whether the intermediary's monitoring device functions or

malfunctions. In other words, the intermediary's signal.r4 mayor may not be informative. I can
now characterize the four states. They are:
• State 1:

eAI

e~, e~

eBL
I '

• State 2:

eA2

e~, e~

eBL
2 '

• State 3:

eA3

e~,

e: eBH
3 '

sA
3

0:,

• State 4:

eA4

e~,

e! eBH
4 '

SA
4

eAH
B eBH
4 ,S4 = 4 .

SA

I
sA
2

B = eBL

eAL

I ' SI

I '

0;, s2B = O~,
B=

s3

0:,
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In state 1, the agent and the intermediary in both forks observe the low productivity
parameter and the intermediary monitoring devices function and hence provide useful information.
In state 2, both agents observe the low productivity parameter, but the two intermediaries observe
nothing. In this state, both intermediary monitoring devices malfunction. In state 3, the two agents
observe the high productivity parameter, and, once again, the two intermediary monitoring devices
malfunction.

Finally, in state 4, agents and intermediaries in both forks observe the high

productivity parameter. lO

I shall assume that PI > P2 and that P4 > P 3 .

That is, the two

10I have assumed that the intermediaries always know when their monitoring devices malfunction. More
involved formulations in which the intermediaries do not know the states in which their monitoring devices have
malfunctioned are possible. These alternate formulations require additional states, and additional constraints on the
principal ' s problem; as such, these formulations make it difficult to obtain concrete results.
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intermediary monitoring devices are reliable in the sense that they are more likely to function than
to fail. The reader will note that the imperfect ~ature of the two monitoring devices results in two
additional states, i.e., states 2 and 3.
The timing of the principal/intermediary/agent game is as follows. First, nature reveals 8A
to the agent and the intermediary receives his signal s4. Second, the principal offers the contract to
the intermediary and to the agent. Third, the agent chooses action e4. Fourth, output x4 is produced
by the agent and the intermediary sends his report ,-A to the principal, indicating what he observed.
Fifth, the principal compensates the intermediary and the agent in A by making transfers

In the remainder of this paper I shall suppose that the principal can verify the veracity of the
report ,-A, when s4

=

rr.

That is, if s4 is noninformative, then the corresponding report ,-A reflects this

fact and the principal can verify that the true facts are indeed as they have been reported. In
symbols, SA =oA=>r A=oA. On the other hand, to keep the principal's problem interesting and to
allow for the possibility of intermediary/agent collusion, I shall permit the intermediary to lie and
report that his signal is noninformative when in fact such is not the case. 11 That is,
s A=8 A=>r AE{8A,oA}. This completes the description of my model. I now consider the benchmark

case in which perfect information is acquired by the principal.

2b. The First Best Optimum
In this case, the principal observes

81 and the agent's action.

When this happens, the

lIThe reader will note that I have restricted the intermediary 's message space in certain states. Specifically,
lying by the intermediary is restricted to states 1 and 4. Put differently, reporting the wrong state of nature is equivalent
to obtaining a noninformative signal. A more general model with more states would permit lying in all four states.

10
principal bypasses the A intermediary and contracts with the A agent directly.

Since this

"A

intermediary now has no role to play, he receives his reservation transfer G , and hence his
reservation utility

VA

in all four states. The principal solves
(1)

The first-order necessary condition requires that
(2)
In other words, in the first best optimum, the marginal disutility of the action is set equal to the

marginal profit. The optimal action e A is the same in all states of nature. The agent receives a
*

transfer which is independent of the state. This transfer equals

t

A +g *'

where g * =g(e *A). I can now

define the full-informationlfirst-best optimum.
Definition: In the full-information optimum, (i) the intermediary and the agent in each fork are held

to their reservation utilities in all states, (ii) equation (2) holds, and (iii) the contract is Pareto
efficient in every state.
I now move on to the more interesting case in which the principal cannot determine either
the realization of SA or the action undertaken by the A agent.

3. Contracting with Intermediary/Agent Collusion

Recall that the principal is unable to monitor the activities of intermediaries and agents in A
and B. Since the principal can never acquire the agent's private information and must rely-in
part--on the intermediary's report r4 to design the optimal contract, it is of considerable interest to
determine the nature of the equilibrium contract that can be implemented by the principal when the

J
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intennediary and the agent in A collude to maximize the total transfers to be received from the
principal.
I shall model collusion between the intennediary and the agent as follows. Before the
revelation of 8A to the agent and at the time of signing the main contract, the agent and the
intennediary in each fork sign a secondary contract which entails the offer and acceptance of a
monetary bribe from the agent to the intennediary.

Naturally, this secondary contract is

unobservable by the principal. The bribe can only be conditioned on what the agent and the

intennediary both observe, i.e., the bribe is a function of the intennediary's report y4 and the agent's
output .xA. With the payment and receipt of the bribe, the agent's total transfer becomes
{T A(• ) - b A(r A,x A)} and the intennediary' s total transfer becomes {G A(• ) +b A(r A,x A) }, where

b A(r A,x A) is the bribe offered by the agent to the intennediary. I shall not be concerned with the

question of how the surplus from the bribe is divided. For my purpose, it is only necessary that the
bribe be paid by the agent to the intennediary.
Collusion by the intennediary and the agent alters the incentives of the various parties but
not- as we shall see- the nature of the optimal contract offered by the principal. To see why the
agent in A might want to bribe the intennediary, consider state 4. In this state, the intennediary is
indifferent between reporting that he has observed 8AH and reporting that he has observed ()A. The
agent, on the other hand, would prefer that the intennediary report ()A. This is one instance in which
a clear rationale exists for the agent to bribe the intennediary.
In order to fonnulate and solve the principal's problem when there is collusion, I shall follow
Tirole (1986, 1988). Tirole's method involves imposing constraints in addition to the usual
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participation and incentive compatibility constraints. These additional constraints are designed to
preclude intermediary/agent collusion and hence make the main contract collusion-proof. The
solution concept that I am using in this paper is that of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Consequently,
the reader should note that in this section I am considering simultaneous collusion in both forks. The
equilibrium contract designed by the principal for A is collusion-proof on the assumption that if the
resulting contract were not constrained to be collusion proof, intermediary/agent coalitions would
form in both forks. The reader will note that this assumption of "simultaneous collusion" is weaker
than the assumption that requires the contract for A to be collusion-proof whether or not there is
collusion in B.

I can now formulate the principal's problem. The principal solves 12

maxe A
j

subject

-A

to

(A

(3a)

-A

G-A T-A
,

ii'

jj

~
\.-I'

vi

A)
p.I (A
eI. + SAI. _ G-II..A _ T-II..,

-A
A
U[ T II.. - g ( e.I )]
(A

p2[T22 - ge2)]~p2[T32-ge3+L1
A

~

"A.
U , V1,

(

3b)

(3)
-A

V(G II.. )

~

"A

V ,Vi,

(3c)

sA )], ()
- A (A
- A (A
sA )] ,3e
( )
3dP3[T33-ge3)]~P3[T23-ge2-L1
A

P2[G2~ + f2~ -g(e/)]~p2[G3~ + T3~ -g(e 3A+~SA)], (3f) P3[G3~ + f3~ -g(e3A)] ~P3[G2~ + f2~ -g(e2A_~SA)],
(3g) Pl[Gl~+fl~-g(elA)]~p2[G2~+f2~-g(e2A)], and (3h) P4[G4~+f4~-g(e4A)] ~P3[G3~+~~-g(e/)].
The four constraints in (3a) and in (3b) are the agent and the intermediary ex post
participation constraints. These constraints tell us that it must be individually rational for the agent
and the intermediary to contract with the principal in every state. Constraints (3c) and (3d) are the
agent's incentive compatibility constraints in states 2 and 3, respectively. These constraints arise
because the principal has imperfect information about SA in these two states. Note that these are

12The collusion-proof transfers to the intermediary and the agent will be denoted by G~
and fA,
respectively.
II
II

13
also the states in which the intermediary's signal is noninformative. Constraint (3c) says that in state
2, the agent should not claim that the state is 3. Similarly, (3d) tells us that in state 3, the agent
should not claim that the state is 2. Constraint (3e) tells us that in state 2, the intermediary should
not be able to bribe the agent to take action at the level that is appropriate for state 3. Similarly, (3f)
tells us that the intermediary should not be able to bribe the agent to claim that the state is 2 when
it is 3. Constraints (3g) and (3h) are the core collusion constraints. Recall that in states 1 and 4, the
intermediary's signal s4 is informative. Thus in these two states, the intermediary can hide this fact.
Given this, (3 g) and (3h) tell us that should the agent bribe the intermediary, then the total sum of
the transfers less the disutility of action in states 1 and 4 cannot be less than the corresponding totals
in states 2 and 3, respectively. Solving the principal's problem (3) subject to (3a)-(3h), I can state

Theorem 1: In the three-tiered hierarchy with intermediary/agent collusion, the principal can
implement the full information optimum contract in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. This contract has
the following features: (i)

e,A =e *A,
1

Vi, (ii) G,~ =0 A, Vi, (iii) f,~ =T A +g , Vi, (iv) only the
II

II

*

intermediary and the agent participation constraints bind, and (v) the equilibrium contract is Pareto
efficient in all four states.

Proof· See the Appendix.
To intuitively verify that the contract specified in Theorem 1 is individually rational,
incentive compatible, and collusion-proof, I shall proceed as follows. I have to show that the
constraints (3a)-(3h) are satisfied. First, by part (iv) of the theorem, constraints (3a) and (3b) hold
with equality. Hence the contract is individually rational for the intermediary and the agent. Second,
-A

-A

-A

-A

because T23 , T32 , G23 , and G32 are not arguments of the principal's profit function or the

/

14
intermediary and the agent utility functions, they can be set by the principal so as to ensure strict
inequality in constraints (3c)-(3f). Hence the contract is incentive compatible for the intermediary
and the agent. Finally, by parts (i), (ii), and (iii) of the theorem and the reliability assumptions

PI > P2 and P4 > P 3 , we see that constraints (3g) and (3h) are also satisfied. Hence the contract
is collusion-proof.
To check that the contract specified in Theorem 1 does indeed implement the first best, recall
the definition of the first-best optimum given in section 2b. First, note that the intermediary and the
agent are held to their reservation utilities by part (iv) of the Theorem. Second, criterion (ii) of the
definition is satisfied because part (i) of the theorem specifies that the first-best action will be taken
in every state of nature. Finally, the fact that the contract is Pareto efficient in every state can be
deduced from conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) of the Theorem. 13
If the principal does indeed offer the contract with the characteristics described in Theorem
1, then his total monetary transfers cannot be altered by changing the intermediary's report or the
agent's action. In other words, the principal can be sure that his monetary obligations will be those
described in Theorem 1. This is because the equilibrium contract is collusion-proof. Alternately put,
the principal offers the best contract possible from the set of feasible contracts that are constrained
to be collusion-proof.
Theorem 1 says that the principal can implement the full information optimum in a BayesNash equilibrium. This is a strong result and it tells us that the first-best implementation result of
Sappington and Demski (1983) generalizes to three-tiered hierarchies. Indeed, we have seen that

J3See the appendix for further details.
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when the private information of the intermediaries and the agents in the two forks of the three-tiered
hierarchy is perfectly correlated, collusion is irrelevant, and it essentially plays no role in the design
of the equilibrium contract since none of the collusion or incentive compatibility constraints bind
at the optimum. The "out of equilibrium" payments to the agent and the intermediary satisfy

f2~ < [fA +g(e*A -i18 A)], ~~ < [fA +g(e*A +i18A)], G2~ < [OA +fA -f2~ +g(e*A -i18 A)], and

G32A < [0 A + fA - fA32 +g(e *A + i18 A)] .
The contract specified in Theorem 1 can be thought of as an incentive scheme, which
effectively places the intermediaries and the agents in the two forks in Prisoner's Dilemma games.
By carefully selecting the "out of equilibrium" transfers, the principal is able to ensure that
misrepresentation of private information does not pay. As such, "telling the truth" is the unique
Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the game for the intermediaries and the agents. Further, the equilibrium
/

contract is Pareto efficient in every state, the first-best action is required in every state, and the
transfers made to the intermediary and the agent are the same in all four states.
The Prisoner's Dilemma game approach to deterring collusion described in this paper
complements the existing literature on collusion in hierarchies. For instance, Kofinan and Lawarree
(1995 hereafter KL) and Laffont and Martimort (1996, hereafter LM) have both studied hierarchies
consisting of a principal, a supervisor (regulator in LM), and an agent (firm in LM). As in this paper,
the occupants of the second and the third tiers of the hierarchy, i.e., the supervisor (regulator) and
the agent (firm), may collude. KL show that in a number of circumstances, the principal can deter
collusion by designing a Prisoner's Dilemma like mechanism.

In this mechanism, a second

supervisor is brought in, and the principal establishes incentives in such a way that these two
supervisors end up policing each other. LM analyze the behavior of two collusive regulators. They
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show that the regulators' access to information introduces increasing returns in the benefit from a
side contract (in my case, the bribe) between a regulator and the firm. This fact enables the principal
to design a mechanism that is similar to the Prisoner's Dilemma mechanism. In this mechanism, the
principal deters collusion by separating the two collusive regulators. As a result, the information
available to anyone regulator is reduced, the transaction costs of collusion increase, and social
welfare rises. Unlike the scenario described in this paper, the KL and the LM papers are not
concerned with correlation in the private information of supervisors (regulators) and agents (firms).
This is because both of these papers are concerned with a single-forked hierarchy. Further, in the
KL paper, both supervisors are identical and they have access to the same information. By explicitly
analyzing a second fork, I have shown that the gains from the design of Prisoner's Dilemma type
mechanisms can be realized in multiforked environments as well.
J

The reader should note that recent research 14 suggests that the first-best implementation result
of this paper and that of Sappington and Demski (1983) typically will not hold if the principal's
problem is subject to constraints in addition to the participation, incentive compatibility, and
collusion constraints. This tells us that the presence ofbudget balance or "yardstick" constraints can
effectively preclude the principal from placing intermediaries and agents in situations like the
Prisoner's Dilemma game. In other words, even in perfectly correlated environments, there are
limits to the power of relative performance evaluation.

14See Batabyal (1998b) for further details.
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5. Conclusions

In this paper I have analyzed a two-forked, three-tiered hierarchy. I focused on the case in
which the private infonnation of the players in the second and in the third tiers of the hierarchy is
perfectly correlated. I showed that in this setting, the principal loses nothing from his inability to
monitor the actions of the intennediaries and the agents. Indeed, the principal can implement the
full infonnationlfirst best optimum in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium even if the intennediaries and the
agents collude.
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Appendix 15

To verify Theorem 1, consider the contract specified by the theorem. In this contract, the
-A

"A

equilibrium agent and intermediary transfers are T .. = T
II

respectively.

The

"out

of equilibrium"

agent

and

+g

-A

*

"A

, Vi, and G.. = G ,Vi,
II

intermediary

transfers

satisfy

It is straightforward to verify that the optimal Bayes-Nash strategy for the agent and the

intermediary in this contract is to always take the first-best action, and to always report the relevant
information truthfully. To see why this is so, consider the following line of reasoning.
First, payments of f.~ =t

A +g

II

*

to the agent and

GA to the intermediary ensure that these two

players will participate in the contract. Hence, constraints (3a)-(3b) hold with equality and the
contract is individually rational for both these players.
-A

- A

- A

- A

Second, because T23 , T32 , G23 , and G32 do not enter the objective functions of any of the
three players, these four "out of equilibrium" transfers can always be chosen by the principal so that
all the incentive compatibility constraints-constraints (3c)-(3 f)-hold with strict inequality in
equilibrium. Thus, the contract is incentive compatible.
Third, under the terms of the contract described in the theorem, the agent always takes the
first-best action and the intermediary always reports truthfully. These two features combined with
the reliability assumptions,

i.e., PI > P 2

and P 4 > P 3 ,

tell us

that the collusion

15Details of the Kuhn-Tucker analysis involved in the proof of Theorem 1 are available from the author upon
request.
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constraints-constraints (3 g)-(3h)-also hold with strict inequality in equilibrium. Thus, the
contract is collusion-proof. The reader should note that the result contained in Theorem 1 is not
independent of the state probabilities. In particular, this result depends on the state probabilities in
the manner specified above. Put differently, for the result in Theorem 1 to hold, we need PI > P 2
andp4 > P 3 •
Fourth, because the equilibrium transfers to the agent are identical, and because the agent
always takes the first best action, the marginal rate of substitution between the transfer and the action
always equals unity. Consequently, the requirements of the definition in section 2b are satisfied.
I conclude that the contract specified by Theorem 1 is individually rational, incentive compatible,
collusion-proof, and that it implements the first-best/full-information optimum.
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